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We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model. The
value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by
developing the project. The allocation of the funds and the learning process are
subject to moral hazard.
The optimal contract is a time-varying share contract whichprovides intertem-
poral risk-sharing between venture capitalist and entrepreneur. The share of the
entrepreneur re‡ects the value of a real option. The option itself is based on
the control of the funds. The dynamic agency costs may be high and lead to
an ine¢cient early stopping of the project. A positive liquidation value explains
the adoption of strip …nancing or convertible securities. Finally, relationship …-
nancing, including monitoring and the occasional replacement of the management
improves the e¢ciency of the …nancial contracting.
Key words: venture …nancing, optimal stopping, dynamic …nancial constraints,
share contracts, security design.
JEL Classi…cation: D83, D92, G24, G31.1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Venture capital has become a major vehicle for the funding of start-up …rms.
In many countries, most notably the United States, venture capital is now the
…nancing mode of choice for projects where “learning” and “innovation” are im-
portant. Because of their innovative nature, venture projects carry a substantial
risk of failure. Only a minority of start-ups are high-return investments: twenty
percent or less are frequent estimates for the fraction of projects where investors
can successfully “cash out”, mostly through IPO’s. Of the remaining, a majority
is sold o¤ privately or merged which can mean anything between a modest suc-
cess and scantly disguised failure with substantial losses. A minority is liquidated
implying a complete write-o¤ of the investment.1
One of the most challenging problems in venture …nancing is to determine
when to release funds for continued development and when to abandon a project.
Many aspects of the venture capital industry suggest that practitioners are well
aware that they face a sequence of starting and stopping problems in the …nancing
of a venture.2 An essential feature of any venture project is the necessity to fund
the project in order to learn more about the uncertain return of the venture.
This process may already start with the provision of seed …nancing to set up a
business plan. This simultaneity of the …nancing decision and the acquisition of
information about the investment project is characteristic of ventures and more
generally of the …nancing of innovation. Surprisingly, the dynamic interaction of
both aspects has received scant attention in the literature.
This paper proposes a simple model to analyze the optimal …nancing of ven-
ture projects when learning and moral hazard interact. A wealth constrained en-
trepreneur o¤ers an investment opportunity to a venture capitalist. The project
can either succeed or fail. The successful completion requires funds for the devel-
opment of the project. The rate of investment controls the probability of success.
A higher investment level accelerates the process of discovery. As the project
1For estimates, see Poterba (1989), Sahlman (1990), Sagari and Guidotti (1991), Gompers
(1995) and Amit, Brander and Zott (1997).
2The staging of the funds, documented in Lerner (1994) and Gompers (1995) is perhaps the
most prominent aspect of the sequential nature of venture …nancing.
1continues to receive …nancing without achieving success, the agents change their
assessment about the likelihood of future success. Eventually the prospect may
become too poor to warrant further investment.
The entrepreneur controls the allocation of the funds and the investment ef-
fort is unobservable to the investor. The control over the funds implies that the
entrepreneur also controls the ‡ow of information about the project. The solution
of the agency con‡ict has to take into account the intertemporal incentives for
the entrepreneur. Suppose, in any given period, the entrepreneur would consider
to divert the capital ‡ow for her private consumption. In the following period she
would then be marginally more optimistic about the future of the project than
the venture capitalist. The entrepreneur would know that the project did not
receive any capital in the preceding period and hence could not possibly generate
a success. But the venture capitalist would continue to believe that the entre-
preneur did as instructed. In consequence he interprets the fact that no success
has been observed as “bad news” about the project. Following a deviation, the
entrepreneur will therefore keep her posterior belief about future success constant
while the posterior belief of the investor is necessarily downgraded. The reward
for the entrepreneur therefore consists of two components. She needs to be com-
pensated for the foregone private bene…ts but also for the downgrading of her
expectations about the future of the project. The longer the experimentation
horizon, the larger is the option value of the diversion. In fact, the compensation
could become so large as to surpass the net value of the project. In turn this
implies the possibility of …nancial constraints in the form of an ine¢cient and
premature end of the project.
1.2. Results and empirical implications
The optimal share contract and the …nancial constraints allow for a number of
empirical implications.
First, our paper provides an analysis of the optimal evolution of the shares of
entrepreneur and venture capitalist. How the parties should optimally split the
prize should depend on the funding horizon and the ‡ow of funds. Our model
predicts that the share of the entrepreneur decreases towards the end. Initially,
the entrepreneur’s share can rise or fall, depending on the discount rate and the
2degree of initial optimism. The expected share of the entrepreneur, however, al-
ways decreases over time. Similarly, the expected return of the venture capitalist
decreases over time and he may even make losses if the project approaches the
stopping time. Empirical …ndings indicate that the entrepreneur is indeed pe-
nalized if the project takes too much time as her equity fraction is diluted from
…nancing round to …nancing round.3
Second, we obtain results for the security design by extending the model
to positive liquidation values in case of abandonment. The liquidation value is
received by selling tangible assets or intermediate results. The venture capitalist
should then either receive strip packages combining common stock and debt or
convertible securities. The optimal contract should reward the entrepreneur only
in the case of success. The venture capitalist should therefore keep a “hard” claim
in case of failure. However, if the venture capitalist would hold exclusively hard
claims, then a premature liquidation is likely.4
Third, a pure share or equity contract could be …nanced at arm’s length, im-
plying that it could be traded in …nancial markets. However an arm’s length share
contract may leave too much surplus to the entrepreneur and the project would be
terminated too early. Our model accounts thus naturally for the observation that
venture …nancing is typically relationship …nancing. Costly monitoring and the
option to replace the entrepreneur may become desirable. Relationship speci…c
…nancing permits the extension of the funding horizon.5
Fourth, short-term re…nancing of the project can never be optimal. We call
short-term …nancing, as distinct from staged …nancing, a …nancial policy where
the entrepreneur attracts funds on a competitive basis in each period. Towards
the end of the e¢cient investment horizon, the expected return is insu¢cient to
cover the necessary outlays for both partners. The e¢cient solution can only
be achieved by a long-term contract which allows for intertemporal risk-sharing.
More precisely, the venture capitalist subsidizes continuation of the project toward
3As new funds are provided in exchange with stock purchase agreements, the shares of the
entrepreneur become diluted, see e.g. Sahlman (1990), Lerner (1995) and Gompers (1995).
4The predominance of convertible preferred stock is documented by Sahlman (1990) and
Trester (1997).
5The frequent usage of monitoring and replacement of management is documented in Gorman
and Sahlman (1989), Sahlman (1990), and Lerner (1995).
3the end in exchange for higher expected pro…ts at the beginning. Consistent with
this result, Sahlman (1990) observes that venture capitalists are protected against
competition by preemptive rights and Anand and Galetovic (1997) report that
venture …nancing is frequently supported by long-term relationships.
We may …nally remark that up-front …nancing as well as staged …nancing are
consistent with our model. Since the optimal contract satis…es the intertemporal
incentive constraints, the funds will be allocated by the entrepreneur as intended
regardless of how the funds are provided over time.6 In Section 7 we discuss the
extension of the model to multiple signals, where stage …nancing arises as the
unique optimal …nancial arrangement.
1.3. Related Literature and Overview
The theoretical research on venture …nance has only recently emerged. In Hart
and Moore (1994), the option of the entrepreneur to repudiate her …nancial oblig-
ations limits the feasible amount of outsider claims. Neher (1994) extends their
approachto stage …nancing as aninstrument to implement the optimalinvestment
path. Admati and P‡eiderer (1994) show that a …xed fraction equity contract
may give robust optimal incentives if it is e¢cient to allocate the control rights to
the venture capitalist. Berglöf (1994) considers convertible debt in a framework
of incomplete contracts to transfer control rights to the value-maximizing party.
Chan, Siegel and Thakor (1990) explain the optimal transition of control between
entrepreneur and venture capitalist in a model with initial uncertainty about the
skill of the entrepreneur. Hellmann (1996) explains the willingness of the entrepre-
neur to relinquish control rights by a trade-o¤ between equity and debt induced
incentives. Trester (1997) argues that the problem of an entrepreneur dissipating
the …rm’s assets can be mitigated if the investor has no option to declare de-
fault and seize the assets. Cornelli and Yosha (1997) analyze the problem of an
entrepreneur manipulating short-term results for purposes of “window-dressing”.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. The
value of the project is characterized in Section 3. The structure and e¢ciency of
short and long-term contracting is examined in Section 4. We extend the model
6Sahlman (1990) discusses up-front …nancing, even in the presence of staging, and Gompers
(1995) analyzes the structure of stage …nancing.
4in Section 5 by allowing for a positive liquidation value of the project and discuss
issues of security design in this context. In Section 6, we analyze the relationship
speci…c instruments such as monitoring and the occasional replacement of the
entrepreneur. Section 7 discusses possible extensions of the model. Section 8
concludes.
2. The Model
The venture is presented as an investment project with uncertain returns in Sub-
section 2.1. The successful realization of the venture is positively correlated with
the volume of …nancing it receives. As the ‡ow of investment sinks into the
project, entrepreneur and investor update their assessment of the prospects of
the project. The evolution of the posterior belief of eventual success represents
the learning process of the agents, which is analyzed in Subsection 2.2. The moral
hazard problem between the entrepreneur and the investor as well as the …nancing
possibilities of the project are …nally described in Subsection 2.3.
2.1. Project with Uncertain Returns
An entrepreneur owns a project with uncertain return. The project is either
“good” with prior probability ®0 or “bad” with prior probability 1 ¡ ®0. If the
project is “good”, then in every period t, there is a certain probability that the
project is successfully completed, in which case it yields a …xed payo¤ R: The
probability of success inperiod t, conditional onthe project beinggood, is denoted
by pt. The probability pt is in turn an increasing function of the investment ‡ow
in period t. Or inversely, a success probability pt requires an investment ‡ow of
c(pt) in period t. We assume that c(pt) is a linear function of pt:
c(pt) = cpt; c > 0. (2.1)
The maximal probability of success in each period is denoted by p (without any
subscript), where 0 < p < 1 and any probability pt 2 [0;p] is feasible in each
period. In other words, any investment beyond c(p) does not increase the prob-
ability of success.
If the project is “bad”, then it will never yield a return and the probability of
success is zero independent of the capital ‡ow. The project can receive …nancing
5over any number of periods and time is discrete and denoted by t = 0;1;:::;T:
The investment process either stops with a successful completion or the project is
eventually abandoned when the likelihood of future success becomes su¢ciently
small.
The uncertainty of the project is resolved over time by an experimentation
process, where the likelihood of success is positively correlated with the investment
in the project. The investment problem is simple as the investment only in‡uences
the conditional probability of success in every period and independent of time.
In particular, the investment ‡ow does not in‡uence the value of the successful
realization, R, or the scrap value if the project should be abandoned. In Section 7
we shall discuss how these modi…cations, as well as time dependent probabilities,
would enrich the predictions of our model.
2.2. Learning
As the experimentation process develops over time, entrepreneur and investor
learn more about the prospects of the project. If success has not yet occurred
at period t, then the participants in the project update their beliefs about the
type of the project. We next determine the evolution of the posterior beliefs. We
denote by ®t+1 the posterior belief that the project is good, based on no discovery
until and including t. The evolution of the posterior belief ®t+1; conditional on
no success, is given by Bayes’ rule as a function of the prior belief ®t and the
capital ‡ow cpt as:
®t+1 =
®t(1 ¡pt)
®t(1 ¡pt)+ 1 ¡®t
. (2.2)
The posterior belief ®t+1 thus decreases over time when success hasn’t been re-
alized. The decline in the posterior belief is stronger for larger investments, as
the participants in the venture become more pessimistic about the likelihood of
success. The posterior belief, again conditional on no success yet, can be repre-





s=0 (1 ¡ ps)
®0
Qt
s=0(1 ¡ps) + 1¡ ®0
: (2.3)
6Under a constant investment policy pt = ^ p; the evolution of ®t is a discrete version




®0(1 ¡ ^ p)
t+1 +1 ¡ ®0
: (2.4)
The evolution of the posterior belief, conditional on no success, under two di¤erent
constant allocation policies is displayed in Fig.1.
Insert Fig. 1 here.
The posterior belief changes only slowly if the participants have very precise
beliefs about the nature of the project, i.e. if ®t is close to either 0 or 1. Cor-
respondingly the event of no success is most informative if the agents have very
di¤use beliefs, i.e. ®t is close to 1
2. In this case the posterior beliefs change most
rapidly. In any case, a higher investment level accelerates the rate at which the
posteriors change over time as displayed in Fig.1.
2.3. Moral Hazard and Financing
The entrepreneur has no wealth initially and seeks to obtain external funds to
realize the project. Financing is available from a competitive market of venture
capitalists. Entrepreneur and venture capitalists have initially the same assess-
ment about the likelihood of success, which is given by the prior belief ®0. The
entrepreneur and venture capitalists are both risk-neutral and have a common
discount factor ± 2 (0;1).
The funds which are supplied by the venture capitalist are to be allocated by
the entrepreneur to generate the desired success R. However the (correct) alloca-
tion of the funds to the project is unobservable to the venture capitalist, and thus
a moral hazard problem arises between …nancier and entrepreneur. Indeed the
entrepreneur can “shirk” and decide to (partially) withhold the investment and
divert the capital ‡ow to her private ends. An equivalent, but perhaps more clas-
sical formulation of the same moral hazard problem is following one: The e¢cient
application of the investment requires e¤ort, which is costly for the entrepreneur.
By reducing the e¤ort, the entrepreneur also reduces the probability of success
and hence the e¢ciency of the employed capital. In both cases, a con‡ict of
interest arises about the use of the funds.
7Initially, the entrepreneur can suggest …nancial contracts to any of the ven-
ture capitalists. The selected venture capitalist then decides whether to accept
or reject. The contract can be contingent on time, outcome and the capital pro-
vided by the investor. However due the moral hazard nature of the …nancing
problem, the contract cannot be made contingent on the (correct) application
of the funds. The design of the contract has to ensure that incentive compat-
ibility and individual participation constraints are satis…ed. The contract may
contain a clause prohibiting that the entrepreneur continues the project once the
contract has expired, for example by transferring ownership of the idea to the
venture capitalist. If such a prohibition is not made, then the entrepreneur can
again suggest …nancial contracts to any of the venture capitalists. For the mo-
ment, we abstractly consider contingent contracts, but in the appropriate places,
we shall discuss which standard securities will be able to perform the tasks of
the contingent contracts. We neglect renegotiation of contracts throughout this
paper.7
Finally, we wish to emphasize that while there is no initial asymmetry in
the information between …nancier and entrepreneur, the asymmetry may arise
over time as the project receives funding. The source of the asymmetry is the
unobservability of the allocation of funds. If entrepreneur and investor have
di¤erent assessments over how the funds have been employed, then in turn they
will have di¤erent posterior probabilities over the likelihood of success. Before
we consider the optimal …nancial contract between entrepreneur and investor, we
…rst analyze the e¢cient investment policy in the absence of the moral hazard
problem.
3. Value of the Venture
The social value of the venture project with prior belief ®0 is maximized by
an optimal investment policy and an optimal stopping point. At the stopping
point the project is abandoned and no further investment is undertaken. The
stopping point itself can either be characterized by the posterior belief ®T at
the stopping point or the real time T at which the project is abandoned. For
7See Bergemann and Hege (1997) for a discussion of renegotiation in dynamic agency
problems.
8any given investment policy fcp0;:::;cpTg there is naturally a one-to-one relation
between ®T and T through Bayes’ rule as developed in (2.3).
We denote by V (®t) the value of the project with posterior belief ®t under
optimal policies. The optimal policies can be obtained by standard dynamic pro-
gramming arguments. Consider …rst the optimal stopping point ®T: Clearly, the
project should receive funds as long as the expected returns from the investment
exceed the costs, or
®TpTR ¡cpT ¸ 0; (3.1)
for some pT 2 [0;p]. Conversely, if the current expected returns don’t exceed the
investment cost, or
®TpTR ¡cpT < 0; (3.2)
then it is optimal to abandon the project, as future returns will only decline
further. It follows from (3.1) and (3.2) that the e¢cient boundary point ®¤
between the investment region and the stopping region is given by:




The posterior belief ®¤ at which stopping occurs decreases when either the return
R increases or the marginal cost c of generating success decreases.
We notice next that if indeed the last investment occurs at ®T, then it is
optimal to choose pT = p due to the linear structure of the problem. Hence we
obtain the value in the terminal period:
V (®T) = ®TpR ¡cp: (3.4)




f®tptR ¡cpt +(1 ¡®tpt)±V (®t+1)g (3.5)
where the posterior belief ®t+1 is determined by the incoming belief ®t and the
investment cpt in period t through Bayes’ rule as expressed in (2.2). The value
function (3.5) represents the implications of an investment policy cpt on current
and future returns. An increase in cpt is costly but it increases the probability
of a successful completion today and the associated expected returns ®tptR. At
the same time, it becomes less likely that the project will have to be continued
9tomorrow as 1 ¡ ®tpt decreases. Finally, if success shouldn’t occur in period t
even with large investment ‡ow cpt, then the posterior belief ®t+1 will decrease
and correspondingly the continuation value of the project, V (®t+1).
The value function (3.5) also indicates that the linearity in pT which the ter-
minal period problem (3.1) displays, is preserved in the intertemporal investment
problem (3.5) as well. The optimal policy is therefore to invest maximally at the
level of cp as long as the posterior belief is above ®¤ and stop as soon the posterior
belief falls for the …rst time below the boundary point ®¤. For transparency, we
may translate this policy into a stopping time policy T¤ in real time. In this case
we ask how long can we maximally invest cp and still maintain posterior beliefs













Evidently, the optimal stopping time T¤ depends on the initial belief ®0 at which
the project is started, T¤ , T¤(®0), but we usually suppress the dependence on
®0 as a matter of convenience. The stopping time T¤ then represents the time
elapsed between starting at ®0 and arriving for the last time at a posterior belief
exceeding ®¤: The socially e¢cient investment policy and the value of the venture
can then be obtained from the solution of the recursive problem (3.5):
Proposition 1 (Optimal Investment Policy).
(i) The optimal policy is to invest maximally cp until T¤.
(ii) The social value of the venture is given by:
V (®0) = ®0p(R ¡c)
1 ¡±T ¤
(1 ¡ p)T ¤






The value function V (®0) presents an intuitive decomposition of the value of
the project.8 The …rst term in (3.7) is the expected value of the project conditional
on the project being good. Notice that the value of the project is discounted
at a rate which compounds the pure discount rate ± and the probability of no
8For future reference, we denote by VT (®0) the value of the project if …nancing occurs at the
maximal rate cp, until T, where obviously VT ¤ (®0) = V (®0).
10discovery (1¡ p) which results in the factor ±(1 ¡ p). The second term captures
the case that the project is bad which occurs with probability (1 ¡ ®0): In this
case, costly experimentation will continue until the stopping time T¤ is reached
and discounting occurs at the rate ± until the project is stopped at T¤. With the
description of the socially e¢cient investment policy in the background, we next
turn to the …nancial contracting between entrepreneur and venture capitalist.
4. Financial Contracting
We begin in Subsection 4.1 by analyzing the provision of venture capital under
short-term contracts. The optimal short-term contracts are simple share con-
tracts between entrepreneur and investor. However as a relationship governed by
short-term contracts has almost no scope for intertemporal transfers, short-term
contracts are generally ine¢cient and will lead to a premature end of the ven-
ture. Consequently, we investigate in Subsection 4.2 the structure of long-term
contracts and in Subsection 4.3 their e¢ciency properties. The model is extended
in Section 5 to allow for a positive liquidation value of the project and issues of
security design appear in this context.
4.1. Short-Term Contracts
The venture capitalist o¤ers his funds for the project in exchange against a share
of the uncertain returns of the venture. Evidently the expected returns for the
venture capitalist must be large enough to justify his investment. At the same
time, the entrepreneur must have su¢cient incentives to truthfully invest the
funds in the project. As the project can only be successfully completed and yield
R if the entrepreneur applies the funds correctly, it follows that the incentives
provided to the entrepreneur should maximally discriminate with respect to the
signal R. With the wealth constraint of the entrepreneur, the most high-powered
incentive contract is obviously the following: she receives a positive share of R if
the project was a success and nothing otherwise. Due to the binary nature of the
project, success or failure, these contracts, which we call share contracts, form
indeed the class of optimal contracts in this environment.
De…ne by St the share of the entrepreneur if R is realized in period t. The
corresponding share of the venture capitalist is (1 ¡St). In a short-term contract,
11the venture capitalist only promises to provide funds for a single period, and then
reconsiders …nancing in the subsequent periods. The expected return from the
current investment must at least exceed the cost of the investment and since there
is competition among the venture capitalists, in equilibrium the venture capitalist
will just break even. Hence the short-term contract must satisfy for any level of
funding cpt the following participation constraint:
®tpt(1 ¡St)R = cpt: (4.1)
On the other hand, the remaining share St for the entrepreneur has to be large
enough for her to invest the funds in the project and not divert them to her pri-
vate ends. This forms the incentive compatibility constraint for the entrepreneur,
which is formally stated by:
®tptStR ¸ cpt: (4.2)
By combining (4.1) and (4.2) we infer that any …nancing under short-term con-
tracts can only be continued as long as the inequality:
®tptR ¸ 2cpt; (4.3)
is satis…ed. The critical value of the posterior belief, denoted by ®s, where short-





By comparing ®s with the socially e¢cient stopping point ®¤ obtained in the
previous section, we immediately obtain the following
Proposition 2 (Short-Term Financing). The venture project is stopped pre-
maturely under short-term …nancing as ®s > ®¤.
The premature stopping indicated by ®s > ®¤ is naturally equivalent to a
funding horizon Ts which is shorter than the e¢cient horizon T¤, where Ts is
determined as T¤ in (3.6). This is a simple, but important benchmark result. It
indicates that e¢cient …nancing requires some form of intertemporal risk sharing
which can only be sustained by commitments made through long-term contracts.
The necessity of intertemporal risk sharing is easy to grasp. As the posterior
12belief ®t deteriorates over time, the expected value which the parties expect
to split decreases as well. Eventually, the competing claims emanating from
the investment problem of the …nancier (4.1) and the agency problem of the
entrepreneur (4.2) lead to a con‡ict. In this respect, …nancing a venture resembles
a team problem where both investor and entrepreneur contribute. The venture
capitalist must earn the equivalent of cpt to justify his investment, while the
entrepreneur must earn the equivalent of cpt if she were to employ the funds
towards the proper end. As ®t decreases these compensations eventually cannot
be covered anymore from the expected proceeds in period t and it follows that
short-term contracts will necessarily terminate too early.
4.2. Long-Term Contracts
In a regime of short-term …nancing the investor has to break even in every pe-
riod as there was no commitment on either side to continue the relationship.
Long-term contracts can improve the intertemporal risk-sharing by replacing the
sequence of participations constraints (4.1) for every period by a single intertem-
poral participation constraint, which covers the entire funding horizon.
By o¤ering the investor a larger share of the return in the early stages of the
…nancing, his shares in the later stage can be lowered, and hence the project can
be continued beyond ®s. But a long-term contract with the associated funding
commitments o¤ers the entrepreneur a rich set of alternative actions, many of
them not desirable from the investor’s point of view. For example, if the entre-
preneur is promised additional funding in the next period, then she may consider
to divert the funds today and bet instead on a positive realization of the project
tomorrow. By implication, the incentives for the entrepreneur today have to be
su¢ciently strong, in particular relative to the incentives o¤ered tomorrow. These
dynamic considerations then generate a rich set of predictions about the sharing
rules over time. In a …rst step we ask what the minimal share of the entrepre-
neur has to be for her to truthfully apply any given sequence of funds to the
project. The second step identi…es the incentive compatible funding policy which
maximizes the value for the entrepreneur and hence is adopted in equilibrium.
The solution to the minimization problem is, again, obtained explicitly by
dynamic programming methods. Consider …rst the …nal period of the contract,
13denoted by T: The share ST has to be high enough for her to invest the funds in
the project rather than to divert them, or formally ST has to satisfy:
min
ST
®TpTSTR ¸ cpT: (4.4)





and the expected value of this arrangement to the entrepreneur is denoted by
ET(®T). Solving the problem recursively we obtain a sequence of value functions,
denoted by ET (®t), where ®t is the current posterior belief and T is the length
of the entire contract. Consequently T ¡t is the number of remaining periods in
the contract. The incentive problem in period t is given by:
ET (®t) , min
St
f®tptStR + ±(1 ¡®tpt)ET(®t+1)g (4.6)
subject to






ET(®0); 8p0 2 [0;pt): (4.7)
We notice the intertemporal structure of the problem. If the entrepreneur cor-
rectly employs the funds, then with probability ®tpt success occurs in period t.
On the other hand, no success occurs with probability 1¡®tpt in which case the
project continues, but the prospects of future success will appear dimmer as ®t+1
is given by
®t+1 =
®t (1 ¡ pt)
1 ¡ ®tpt
< ®t.
The inequality (4.7) requires that for a given allocation of funds cpt, the share St
has to be large enough to prevent any diversion of funds. The diversion of funds,
represented by p0 < pt, a¤ects the payo¤s for the entrepreneur in two ways.
Consider …rst the contemporaneous e¤ect. The likelihood of success today will
be smaller as p0 < pt, but the entrepreneur enjoys the utility from the diverted
funds c(pt ¡p0). The second and dynamic e¤ect is that a continuation of the
contract in the next period becomes more likely. And as less funds are applied to
the project today, there is less reason to change the posterior belief and clearly:
®0 =




= ®t+1; for p0 2 [0;pt):
14After all, the event of no success shouldn’t surprise and lead to a smaller change
in the posterior belief as less resources have been devoted to the project. In
consequence, the entrepreneur will be more optimistic about future success as she
has seen (and provided) less evidence against it, and naturally the continuation
value will be higher with more optimistic beliefs:




If the entrepreneur were to withhold the funds, the private belief ®0 would diverge
from the public belief ®t+1, and to fend o¤ the informational asymmetry, the
entrepreneur is granted an informational rent. The source of the rent is the control
over the conditional probability pt and through it over the learning process, and
we shall refer to it as the learning rent.
It is now apparent that there are two forces which help to realign the interest
of the entrepreneur with the ones of the investor. First, a larger share St if success
occurs today relative to the share St+1 if success occurs tomorrow. Second, the
discounting of future returns at the rate ± depresses the incentives of the entre-
preneur to postpone the successful realization of the project. In consequence, the
more myopic the entrepreneur is, the less binding are the intertemporal incentive
constraints.
The solution St of the minimization problem (4.6)-(4.7) delivers the expected
value ET (®t) the entrepreneur receives for a given funding policy, where ET (®t)
satis…es the recursive equation:
ET(®t) = ®tptStR + ±(1 ¡®tpt)ET(®t+1): (4.8)
In the …rst step, we were concerned with the minimal share the entrepreneur has
to receive for any given level of funding. In the next step we ask how and when
the funds should be released so as to maximize the value of the venture. As
the market for venture capital is competitive, in equilibrium the net value of the






VT (®0) ¸ ET (®0): (4.10)
15The constraint (4.10) incorporates the sequence of incentive constraints through
ET (®0) and the participation of the investor by requiring non-negative pro…ts
in form of the inequality. The preceding analysis provides the important hints
on the solution of (4.9)-(4.10) as well. Consider any aggregate investment the
investor would like to contribute to the project and the remaining issue is only
how the funds should be distributed over time. If the funds are invested only
slowly into the project, then the funding commitment necessarily extends over
a longer horizon and the investor faces more intertemporal incentive constraints.
These constraints increase the share of the entrepreneur and hence decrease the
investor’s share. Thus the optimal solution is to invest in each period up to the
e¢cient level cp. The complete solution of St and ET (®t) based on the programs
(4.9)-(4.10) is summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 (Share Contract and Entrepreneurial Value).
(i) The value function of the entrepreneur is given by:

































The intertemporal contract St ensures that the entrepreneur employs the cap-
ital in every period towards the discovery process. The three elements in the share
contract as displayed in (4.12) may seem rather inaccessible at …rst, but can be
decomposed and traced to the di¤erent aspects of the agency problem, namely
(i) static agency costs, (ii) intertemporal agency costs, and (iii) informational
agency costs.
(i) If the project would be …nanced only for single period and hence T = t = 0;




16(ii) If the investor would like to fund the venture until time T > 0, but could
observe the evolution of the posterior ®t, so that the entrepreneur would not have
access to the learning rent, then the minimal share o¤ered at time t would have






The new aspect in the intertemporal agency problem is the option to withhold
…nancing for a single period, but continue afterwards as instructed until T. To
prevent the delay in any period, the investor has to provide stronger incentives.
The higher additional compensation is necessary as the deadline T, at which
funding is stopped is relatively remote. As the deadline comes closer, or T ¡t is
decreasing, the need for additional incentives becomes weaker. Notice also that
the (4.14) only depends on the “time to go” and is independent of the posterior
belief ®t.











which forms the basis for the learning rent of the entrepreneur. It depends on
the value of the current beliefs and the rate p at which updating of the posterior
beliefs occurs relative to the rate of discounting ±. The rate of updating p is the
quantity of information the entrepreneur controls at each instant of time. The
informational rent is hence increasing in the quantity of information under in‡u-
ence of the entrepreneur, but damped by discounting, as the value of information
today is larger than tomorrow. The three elements (4.13)-(4.15) together deter-
mine the share of the entrepreneur. An illustration of the decomposition of the
sharing rule is given in Fig.2.
Insert Fig.2 here.
The behavior of the shares St over time is thus determined by an underlying
option problem. The reward implied by the shares St has to be equal to the value
of the option of diverting funds for a single period. The value of this particular
option is determined as any regular option by the volatility of the underlying
state variable and the time over which the option can be exercised. Here, the
17volatility is the conditional probability p at which updating occurs and the time
of the option right is the remaining length of the funding, T ¡ t.
The optimal (arm’s length) contract is hence a time-varying share or equity
contract. The time-varying share contract presents the solution to a real option
problem, where the real option is the control of information in every period. Some
implications for the intertemporal sharing of the returns are recorded next:
Proposition 4 (Evolution of Shares over Time).
(i) St has at most one interior extremum in t and then it is a maximum.
(ii) For ± su¢ciently close to 1, St is monotonically decreasing.
Proof. See Appendix.
Earlier in this section we identi…ed two elements which provide incentives to
allocate the funds truthfully in period t: (a) decreasing shares over time and
(b) su¢ciently strong discounting. Proposition 4 identi…es the interplay between
these two forces. If discounting doesn’t work because the remaining time horizon
is too short (i) or discounting is too weak (ii), then the shares have to fall over
time. On the other hand, the shares of the entrepreneur can only increase initially
(i), when discounting (due to the length of the funding horizon ^ T) is su¢ciently
strong to insure incentive compatibility.
4.3. Equilibrium and Ine¢ciency
The e¢cient funding policy and the associated value ET (®0) to the entrepreneur
for any given funding horizon T is identi…ed in Proposition 3. The …nal question
is to what horizon the venture capitalist is willing to extend his commitment and
whether the e¢cient horizon T¤ can be attained. The entrepreneur participates
in the project until T if the expected net value of the project exceeds the expected
value the entrepreneur receives, as represented by the inequality (4.10): VT(®0) ¸
ET(®0): The e¢cient horizon T¤ can be achieved if at T¤ we have:
VT ¤(®0) ¸ ET ¤(®0): (4.16)
The equilibrium contract and the implied funding horizon is determined with the
assistance of Proposition 3 and the participation constraint (4.10) of the investor.
18We have to distinguish two cases. If the project is not su¢ciently rich to be
continued until T¤, or in other words if
VT ¤(®0) < ET ¤(®0);
then the funding horizon is determined by ^ T, where ^ T is the largest time horizon
for which the value of the project exceeds the value of the compensation for the
entrepreneur
^ T = maxfT +1jVT(®0) > ET(®0)g: (4.17)
In the second case, the project is su¢ciently rich to allow for an e¢cient …nancing,
or formally:
VT ¤(®0) ¸ ET ¤(®0); (4.18)
in which case funding is extended until T¤. In equilibrium, the net value of the
project has to be allocated completely to the entrepreneur, or
V ^ T (®0) = E^ T (®0);
due to competition among the venture capitalists. Hence if the inequality holds
strictly in either (4.17) and (4.18), then the remaining surplus has to be given to
the entrepreneur in a way compatible with the incentive constraints. In the case
of (4.17) this can be achieved by a one period continuation as a “winding-down”
phase, where S ^ T is determined as in Proposition 3 but with a smaller capital ‡ow
cp ^ T < cp, as cp itself would violate the participation constraint of the investor
by de…nition of ^ T. In the case of (4.18), the project is rich enough to guarantee
the entrepreneur a larger share than the one determined by St in Proposition
3. But as these shares also have to satisfy the sequence of incentive constraints,
their intertemporal behavior will be similar to St. The e¢ciency properties of the
long-term contracting are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Ine¢ciency).
(i) Long-term contracts allow for an extended funding horizon ^ T (relative to
short-term …nancing), but never exceed T¤:
(ii) The funding horizon ^ T of the optimal long-term contracts may not attain T¤.
(iii) The funding horizon ^ T increases in R and ®0 and decreases in c:
19Proof. See Appendix.
As the funding horizon ^ T increases with improved conditions for the project,
one may wonder whether the ine¢ciency indicated in Proposition 5:(ii) will even-
tually disappear entirely. The answer here is rather subtle. As, to take one ex-
ample, the return R increases, ^ T increases but so does T¤. Eventually T¤ may
become so large that the informational rent of the entrepreneur becomes too large
and the project will have to be stopped at some ^ T < T¤. The example in Fig. 3
illustrates that better projects (with larger R) will indeed receive longer funding
commitments as Proposition 5 predicts, but the equilibrium allocation may never
attain social e¢ciency.
Insert Fig. 3 here.
5. Liquidation Value and Security Design
In this section, we introduce a liquidation value of Lt > 0, which is collected
whenever the project ends without having succeeded. The value Lt represents
intermediate outcomes of the venture and captures the proceeds from selling the
remaining tangible assets if the project is liquidated. The value Lt is a determin-
istic function of time and does not depend on the behavior of the entrepreneur.
We assume that Lt ¸ ±Lt+1 for all t. The liquidation value hence contains no
information about the actions of the entrepreneur. It is meant to represent the
value created by veri…able actions. The condition on the growth of Lt merely
ensures that the project is not continued without the entrepreneur.9
The liquidation value enhances the social value of the project. If the project
is supposed to be liquidated in T, then the expected net present value is (1¡®0+
®0(1¡p)T)±TLT, which is the probability to reach T multiplied by the discounted
value in T. The optimal contract should award the liquidation payo¤ so as to
relax the …nancial constraint on the funding horizon ^ T. The idea of the optimal
share contract under limited liability is to reward the entrepreneur if and only if
she was successful. But a pure equity contract would give the entrepreneur a part
of the liquidation value. This necessarily weakens the incentive structure, as by
diverting funds, she would increase the likelihood of reaching the …nal period T,
9The evolution of Lt could also be stochastic as long as Lt ¸ ±ELt+1.
20and with it an additional payo¤ STLT. The optimal contract therefore needs to
split the claims in the case of success from the ones in the case of liquidation. A
pure equity contract can’t achieve this and a mixture between debt and common
equity, or a convertible security become necessary.
De…ne a debt contract as a pro…le of debt claims Dt ¸ 0, which are puttable at
any time t and bear no coupon. Similarly, a time-varying common stock contract
is denoted by a pro…le of fractions At ¸ 0 of total equity that the entrepreneur
receives if the project is terminated in t (successfully or unsuccessfully). The
optimal …nancial contract can then be achieved by a mixture of debt and common
equity, or a convertible security:
Proposition 6 (Security Design).
(i) An optimal contract is provided by a mixture of debt and common equity with




(ii) A convertible preferred stock held by the investor with a nominal value of Dt
and converted into a share 1 ¡ St of common stock if exercised in period t also
represents an optimal contract.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the “strip …nancing” the venture capitalist retains equity and debt, and
the debt claim increases at the rate r, where 1
1+r = ±, until DT reaches LT. The
incentive compatible equity share At of the entrepreneur, which would be St if
indeed R would be distributed, has to increased to account for the seniority claim
of Dt on R in the case of success. An equivalent distribution of the pay-o¤s can
be achieved by a convertible preferred stock, as indicated by Proposition 6(ii).
The time-varying conversion price is given by Dt
1¡St:10
Interestingly, there is some empirical evidence that debt becomes more im-
portant as a …nancing tool towards later stages of venture projects.11 In our
model debt has a function only at the termination date and this might provide
an element to understand this pattern in the dynamic capital structure in venture
…nancing. The preceding discussion already indicated that in many situations a
10We recall that St is the minimal incentive compatible share if the entire R is distributed.
11See Amit, Brander and Zott (1997).
21pure sharing contract cannot be optimal. The corollary presents precise condi-
tions.
Corollary 1. A common stock contract At does not constitute an optimal con-
tract if and only if the …nancing ends ine¢ciently early: ^ T < T¤:
A combination of debt and equity could relax the …nancial constraints faced by
a pure equity solution. Common equity is ine¢cient because equity gives too little
of the liquidation value to the venture capitalist in case the project fails. We note
…nally that a pure debt contract may be ine¢cient for exactly the opposite reason.
Debt may convey too much of the liquidation value to the venture capitalist and
encourage premature liquidation.
6. Monitoring and job rotation
In this section aspect of relationship …nancing are considered which may reduce
the ine¢ciency indicated in Proposition 5: (i) monitoring and (ii) changing the
management. Both modi…cations imply the transfer of substantial control rights
to the venture capitalist and hence point to the relationship aspect of venture
capital …nancing. The focus is on the optimal timing of these control instruments.
Consider …rst the possibility of monitoring the research e¤ort of the venture
capitalist. Monitoring is costly and the venture capitalist has to spend mpt >
0 to monitor the entrepreneur in period t.12 In return, the venture capitalist
receives an accurate signal about the application of the funds. The signal is
veri…able and hence punishment in case of a deviation (a signal which di¤ers
from the contractually agreed e¤ort) can be implemented. Hence, the moral
hazard problem is eliminated in the periods where monitoring takes place.
The optimal timing is determined by the costs and bene…ts of monitoring
in the intertemporal agency problem. The expected present cost of monitoring in
period t is simply mpt adjusted by discounting and the probability of reaching pe-
riod t, as the project may be successfully completed before t. Hence the expected
12The cost of monitoring is thus linear in the ‡ow of funds cpt. It can be conceived as an
accounting or control system, the cost of which are increasing in the size of the operation to be
monitored.
22present cost of monitoring are decreasing with time. The bene…ts of monitoring
come from the static as well as the intertemporal component in the share St. If
monitoring occurs in period t then the share of entrepreneur can be set to St = 0,
as there is no need to provide any incentives in period t. But monitoring in period
t also a¤ects the incentives in all preceding periods. We recall that the value of
diverting funds in t0 < t was partially due to the possibility to have a share in
the success later on. But monitoring in period t excludes this option at least for
period t and hence the share of the entrepreneur can be reduced marginally in
all periods preceding t. The direct bene…ts from monitoring (St = 0) are clearly
decreasing in t due to discounting, but the indirect bene…ts increase as the num-
ber of periods which enjoy the marginal reduction increase. E¢cient monitoring
occurs where the reduction in the informational rent for the entrepreneur per unit
cost of monitoring is maximized.
Proposition 7 (Monitoring Policy).
The optimal policy is to monitor towards the end of the project.
Proof. See Appendix.
Monitoring then occurs towards the end of the venture as the discounting of
the costs and the indirect bene…ts dominate the direct savings due to monitoring
uniformly. Notice also that in the monitoring phase all the residual gains are
allocated to the investor.
The timing of the monitoring in our model is partially due to the uniform rate
at which information is generated. More generally, the bene…ts of monitoring in
period t are increasing in the amount of information which is generated inperiod t.
Some other implications of a more general information structure will be discussed
in the next section.
Consider next the possibility of replacing the current manager, entrepreneur
or not, by a new manager. The …nancing horizon ^ T of the project may then be
subdivided into several managerial job spells. We investigate the following exten-
sion of the model. In any period t, the entrepreneur or the incumbent manager
can be replaced by a new manager. There are no di¤erences between the original
entrepreneur and successive managers, in particular concerning productivity and
moral hazard. As before, the entrepreneur initially owns the project and tries to
capture as much of the surplus as possible.
23Managerial job rotation reduces the informational rent of each manager by
restricting the duration of each individual manager. However, for the (initial) en-
trepreneur and the investor outside managers are costly, as the founding partners
have to concede shares to the future managers. The objective for the initial pair
is therefore to minimize the pay-outs to succeeding managers. For this reason,
the replacement of the entrepreneur should be scheduled as late as possible.
Each manager requires a compensation which is determined exactly as the
shares St of the entrepreneur. As there is no cost in replacing the manager,
the payout is minimized when the manager changes in every period.13 The cost
of developing the venture with a sequence of manager is then equal to cpt +cpt,
where one term accounts for the cost of investment and the other for the incentive
costs of the manager. Proposition 2 indicates that the e¢cient termination then
occurs at Ts.
Proposition 8 (Replacement).
(i) It is optimal to replace the entrepreneur if and only if the long-term contract
would otherwise stop at ^ T < Ts:
(ii) With optimal replacement the project will be stopped at Ts. The entrepre-
neur remains in place until the value of the project net of compensations to the
managers is disbursed to her. Thereafter, a new manager is brought in every
period.
Proof. See Appendix.
The replacement of the founding entrepreneur constitutes an empirical reg-
ularity in the venture capital industry, see Gorman and Sahlman (1989). We
may also add that earn outs are ine¢cient in this framework.14 The rationale
is essentially the same as the one exposed in Section 5. A quit payment works
against the idea of making all bene…ts contingent on success. Thus, one insight of
the present model is that earn outs, by providing insurance in the case of failure,
are a costly practice in an environment with an uncertain completion date.
13We note that the general analysis suggested here carries over to more general settings with
switching costs or decreasing e¢ciency of subsequent manangers.
14See Sahlman (1990) for the observation that the founding entrepreneur often receives little
protection against the threar of being put aside.
247. Discussion and Extensions
In this paper, the venture is characterized by a simple binary structure. In each
period success is possible and the likelihood of success depends on the belief
®t and the intensity pt at which the project is developed. The investment ‡ow
in‡uences only the probability by which success is generated, and the prize R is
constant over time. In this section we discuss how several extension would modify
our results. We consider in particular (i) time-varying returns Rt, (ii) multiple
signals and staging and (iii) a time-varying information ‡ow.
Time Varying Returns Rt. The value of the successful realization, R, was
assumed to be constant throughout this paper. But the investment process may
also have a cumulative e¤ect on the value of a successful realization. and hence
lead to an increasing sequence of Rt over time. An increasing value Rt would
tend to reduce the ine¢ciency problem documented in Proposition 5. With an
increasing Rt, the share St of the entrepreneur could be reduced further towards
the end as the incentive constraints are based on the composite StRt. Conversely,
a decreasing sequence Rt would make funding even more precarious. The pos-
itive e¤ect of an increasing Rt points to the importance of value creation and
production of tangible assets during the investment process.15
Multiple Signals and Staging. This paper portrays a simple venture which
ends after a single positive signal is received. Clearly the arrival of good and
bad news may be a more complex process. Frequently, projects are divided into
various stages which are de…ned by the completion of certain intermediate results.
In these circumstances continued …nancing may be conditional on the successful
completion of earlier stages.
The basic model we analyzed describes the evolution of the incentives in any
component of such staged projects. The entire project would simply be a sequence
of such stages, each giving rise to an optimal stopping time. In each individual
problem Rt would constitute the continuation value after having received an in-
termediate result. Each stopping problem determines how long to wait for the
arrival of an intermediate signal before the project is stopped. Otherwise the
previous analysis carries over and the share contract for each stage concerns the
15Gompers (1995) presents evidence that the value of tangible assets and the length of the
…nancing rounds increase with the duration of the venture.
25sharing of the incremental value produced in that stage.
The sequential arrival of information then supports stage …nancing as the op-
timal arrangement. To see this, suppose the contracting parties had the choice to
contract either on a strong …nal signal (i.e. completion of the marketable prod-
uct) or on a …ner sequence of intermediate signals. The sequencing, implied by
the staging, splits the horizon over which the intertemporal incentive constraints
have to be compounded. In other words, the entrepreneur realizes that she must
produce the intermediate result …rst in order to receive continued …nancing. This
reduces her incentives to procrastinate in the intermediate periods.
Time Varying Information Flow. The investment ‡ow cpt controls the
conditional probability of success pt, and via pt, the evolution of the posterior
from ®t to ®t+1. The marginal cost of generating success in terms of probability
was assumed to be constant in the level of pt (up to the maximum p) as well as
constant over time.
The optimal investment problem with a general increasing and convex cost
function c(pt) shares the same structural features as the model here, but, nat-
urally, would not lead to an explicit solution as presented in Proposition 1 and
3. If the costs of generating success vary over time, then the information ‡ow,
associated with pt, would be timed so as to coincided with periods where the costs
are relatively low. Periods with a higher pt would then constitute periods with a
“learning boost”. We saw in the previous section that the bene…ts of monitoring
are positively related to the volatility of information. Monitoring would then tend
to occur in periods where much information is produced. In the presence of se-
quential arrival of information, we would expect monitoring to be most prevalent
in periods before the next …nancing stage.16
8. Conclusion
This paper investigated the provision of venture capital when the investment ‡ow
controls the speed at which the project is developed. As the binary outcome of
the project is uncertain, the speed of development in‡uences the (random) time
at which the project yields success and the information which is acquired by the
16See Lerner (1995) for empirical evidence on such a correlation.
26investment ‡ow. The role of the entrepreneur is to control the application of the
funds which are provided by the venture capitalist.
The paper provides a rationale for long-term contracting as these contracts
achieve best the goal of distributing the entrepreneur’s return over time in a way
which maximizes the research horizon. It is further shown that the compensation
of the entrepreneur is similar to an option contract, and as such depends on the
length of the contract and the volatility of the information induced through her
actions. The option expresses the value of the intertemporal incentive constraint.
As the value of the option may become exceedingly large, relationship …nancing
may become necessary. In consequence, the optimal timing of monitoring and
replacement of the entrepreneur are analyzed.
The paper focuses on the …nancing of venture projects. But the interaction
between investment and learning process and the incentives necessary to imple-
ment both processes is central for the …nancing of R&D in general. The present
work may therefore be considered as a step in developing further insights into the
optimal …nancing of innovation.
279. Appendix
This appendix collects the proofs to all propositions in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 1: The value of an arbitrary investment policy starting
at t and ending after T, denoted by fcpt;cpt+1;:::;cpTg; can be expressed by













r=t (1 ¡®rpr) = 1: From Bayes’ rule in (2.2) we obtain
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: (9.4)
Consider now the optimal investment policy cpt in period t. By rewriting (9.4)
as:
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it appears immediately that (9.5) is linear in pt, and thus it is either optimal to
allocate the capital maximally at cp or not to allocate any capital at all. Hence
until the project is stopped, in each period capital is allocated at the maximal
rate cp: In consequence the stopping time is given by T¤ as de…ned in (3.6). By









and in particular for ®0,
V (®0) = ®0p(R ¡ c)
1 ¡ ±T ¤
(1 ¡ p)
T ¤





28The proof to Proposition 3 relies on the following lemma, which describes the
optimal policy for the entrepreneur.
Lemma 1 (Optimal Policy of the Entrepreneur).
(i) The optimal policy for the entrepreneur is always either p0 = 0 or p0 = pt.
(ii) If the optimal policy is p0 = pt for some ®t, then pt remains the optimal policy
for all ® > ®t.
Proof. (i) Consider …rst the expected value of the entrepreneur for an arbitrary























or, after separating the behavior in t; as











If the entrepreneur would consider diverting funds in period t, then she wishes to

















The expression (9.6) is linear in p0 and the …rst part of the lemma follows directly.












¸ cpt > 0; (9.7)
where the …rst inequality is due to the optimality and the second is due to pt > 0.
By monotonicity, the …rst inequality is preserved by any ® > ®t.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Consider the value function ET (®0) of the entre-
preneur in the initial period t = 0, obtained solving (4.6)-(4.7) recursively. By
29Lemma 1, ET (®0) has to be equal to the value generated by a maximal deviation
today which is followed by compliance in all future periods:











which in turn is equivalent to ET (®0) = cp0+ ®0
®1±ET (®1): The general recursion
of the value function then yields:











and rearranging by using (9.3) we get:







s=0 (1 ¡ ps)
; (9.11)
which in turn is equivalent to (4.11) if pt = p for all t.
(ii) The share contract St is obtained by equating (9.9) and (4.8) which yields:
®tptStR = cpt + ®t
®t+1±ptET(®t+1), and after using (9.9) again, we get
®tptStR = (1¡ pt)cpt + ptET(®t); (9.12)
which yields immediately (4.12) after replacing ET(®t) with the explicit expres-
sion obtained in (9.11) if pt = p for all t. Finally, pt = p follows immediately
from Proposition 1 and the fact that the incentive compatible contract St only
depends on the continuation value as just described.
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Consider the share function St as derived in (4.12)






























It is then su¢cient to prove that the share function St ´ S (t) as a continuous
function of t has at most one interior extremum, and that it has to be a maximum.































from which it follows after inspection that S0 (t) can cross zero at most once and
only from above.
(ii) By inspecting again condition (9.14), we …nd that as ± ! 1, the right
hand side of the equivalent condition eventually becomes positive and the left
hand side negative, which proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Consider any project with ®t > ®s > ®t+1 > ®¤;
when …nancing occurs at the rate of cp. Then, by Proposition 2, there will
be no …nancing in period t + 1 with short-term contracts, although it would
be e¢cient, since ®t+1 > ®¤. Under a long-term contract, the investor can be
given ®t(1 ¡St)pR > pc in period t, and ®t+1(1 ¡St+1)pR < pc, and have
his intertemporal participation constraint balanced over the periods. This then
allows …nancing to proceed strictly longer than under a short-term contract and
enhance the e¢ciency of the contractual arrangement.
(ii) The example associated with Fig. 3 veri…es the claim.
(iii) Consider the di¤erence VT (®0) ¡ET (®0) for a given T, as given by Propo-
sition 1 and 3. The di¤erence is increasing in R and ®0 and decreasing with
c. The equilibrium horizon ^ T can be increased with increases in the di¤erence
VT (®0) ¡ ET (®0):
Proof of Proposition 6. The value of the project with liquidation value,
denoted by V L
T (®0), is given by
V L
T (®0) = VT (®0) +®0 (± (1 ¡ p))
T+1LT;
where VT (®0) is as de…ned earlier inProposition1. The duration ^ T of the contract
is determined by




T (®0) > ET (®0)
ª
; (9.15)
where ET (®0) is as de…ned in Proposition 3 and the last period ^ T is again a
“winding-down” period which insures that in equilibrium:
V L
^ T (®0) = E ^ T (®0): (9.16)
31The entrepreneur receives the loan necessary to pursue the project until ^ T in
advance.
(i) Since the debt claim grows at the rate r, the investor is indi¤erent over
the particular period t at which he claims payment of the debt as long as he
is assured to receive Dt in the particular period t. Moreover, in any period in
which he doesn’t claim the debt there is some probability that a success occurs.
Hence he will claim the debt only if no success has been observed in period ^ T.
By condition (9.16) he is willing to participate. Finally, for the entrepreneur,
her share will be higher, namely At as speci…ed in (5.1), to compensate her for
the debt claim which has seniority. But At (R ¡ Dt) is just equal to the minimal
compensation StR, necessary to satisfy the intertemporal incentive constraints
as proven in Proposition 3. Hence the contract induces her to truthfully direct
the funds to the project as well. Thus the speci…ed mixture of debt and equity
implements the optimal outcome.
(ii) The argument is almost identical to the one provided under (i).
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose the entrepreneur receives a share AT > 0 of the
liquidation proceeds if liquidation occurs in T: The modi…ed incentive constraint
in period T then becomes:
®TpATR + (1 ¡ ®Tp)ATLT ¸ cp + ATLT;
which implies that surplus the entrepreneur can guarantee himself in T increases
from cp to cp + ATLT. From equation (9.12) in the proof of Proposition 3, we
can then infer that this in fact increases At in all periods. Thus the value of the
entrepreneur, denoted by EL
T (®0) when she receives a share of the liquidation
value, is higher than when she doesn’t. If ^ T, de…ned by









is indeed smaller than T¤, then we clearly have ¹ T > ^ T, with ¹ T being de…ned by:




T (®0) > ET (®0)
ª
;
since ET (®0) < EL
T (®0), for all T. But this implies in particular that V L
¹ T (®0) >
V L
^ T (®0) as ¹ T > ^ T. Since inequilibrium we have V L
^ T (®0) = EL
^ T (®0)and V L
¹ T (®0) =
E ¹ T (®0), it follows that a pure sharing contract is not optimal and will not be
chosen in equilibrium by the entrepreneur.
32Proof of Proposition 7. Monitoring is costly and reduces the social surplus
whichcan be distributedbetween entrepreneur and venture capitalist. The bene…t
of monitoring is the reduction in E (®0) which can then be used to extend the
lengthof the project …nancing. Monitoring shouldtherefore occur in those periods
where the reduction in E (®0) is maximized per unit cost of monitoring. The
expected cost of monitoring in period t is given by: C (t) , ±t(®0(1 ¡ p)t + 1 ¡
®0)mp. The bene…t of monitoring in period t only is B(t) , E (®0) ¡ Et(®0),
where the superscript t denotes the period in which monitoring occurs. We next
compute the bene…t of monitoring explicitly. Suppose we would monitor in period
t, then the value to the entrepreneur in t is






after using (9.9) and (9.10). Rewritten in terms of ®t; we obtain:






The value function in t ¡ 1, with monitoring in period t, can be obtained by
backwards induction:








For the general recursion we would like to write all numerators in terms of ®t¡1;







































(1 ¡p)cp + pE (®t)
(1 ¡ p)
t : (9.18)
We shall show that the maximum is always achieved at t = T, and as t is discrete,
it is su¢cient to show that
(1 ¡ p)cp + pE (®t+1)
(1 ¡p)
t+1 ¡
(1 ¡ p)cp + pE(®t)
(1 ¡p)
t > 0; 8t · T,
which is veri…ed by substituting E (®t) by E(®t+1), using (9.9).
Proof of Proposition 8. (i) The social cost of continuation with a sequence of
one-period managers is cp+cp; where one term re‡ects the cost of …nancing and
the other term the incentive costs to the manager. The e¢cient stopping point
for this arrangement is therefore ®s. The entrepreneur is only replaced by the
manager when it leads to the creation of surplus, which by implication can only
occur if exclusive …nancing with the entrepreneur would only lead to ^ T < Ts.
(ii) The compensation to the managers is minimized by replacing them in
every period as they receive no intertemporal rents in this case. From the view-
point of the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, the compensation of new
managers is a cost as similar to the monitoring cost and hence the sequential
employment of entrepreneur and manager is as in the case of monitoring.
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Figure 9.1: Volume of …nancing cp and evolution of posterior belief.








































































Figure 9.2: Evolution of the share S(t) over time and decomposition
































Figure 9.3: Return R and duration of …nacing T.
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